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Interpreting Sustainability in Economic Terms: 
Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity 
 




Economists have expended considerable effort to develop economically meaningful definitions of the 
somewhat elusive concept of “sustainability.” We relate such a definition of sustainability to well known concepts 
from neoclassical economics, in particular, potential Pareto improvements (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) and inter-
personal compensation. In the inter-temporal realm, we find that dynamic efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a notion of sustainability that has normative standing as a goal for public policy. We define 
sustainability as dynamic efficiency plus intergenerational equity. Further, we argue that it is not unreasonable for 
economists to focus on the efficiency element, leaving equity considerations to the political process. The analogy to 
the relationship between potential Pareto improvements and (intragenerational) transfers can facilitate discussions 
about sustainability, both within the economics community and as part of an interdisciplinary discourse, and makes 




There has been much debate among economists, and between economists and nearly 
everyone else regarding the meaning of the frequently employed concept of “sustainability.” In 
this note, we suggest that a broadly-accepted and normatively useful notion of sustainability can 
be better understood by breaking it into two components, both of which are well defined in 
economics: dynamic efficiency and intergenerational equity.  Within this realm, there are sound 
reasons for economists to focus on policy criteria associated with the dynamic efficiency element 
of sustainability. 
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission placed sustainability on international political and 
scientific agendas with its report, “Our Common Future” (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987). The Commission proposed the widely embraced definition that 
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“development is sustainable when it meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet theirs” (WCED 1987). This is the definition we use as our 
starting point. We find that – contrary to some claims – sustainability is not only about 
intergenerational equity; rather, widely-held views of sustainability encompass elements of both 
efficiency and distributional equity. Furthermore, much as economists have long focused on 
potential rather than actual Pareto improvements, they need not be apologetic for focusing on 
dynamic efficiency, leaving (admittedly important) equity considerations to the political process. 
 
2. Dynamic Efficiency 
The definition of sustainability offered by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) is broadly accepted and seems to have intuitive appeal: meeting the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. In the 
absence of efficiency, constant consumption at no more than a subsistence level could satisfy this 
requirement, yet it would surely not be accepted as a reasonable social goal or target for public 
policy. Any appealing normative criterion for public policy in this domain ought to include some 
notion of “non-wastefulness.” That is, a meaningful definition of sustainability which has 
normative standing as a social goal ought to include dynamic efficiency, expressed formally as 
the maximization of 
(1)  W(t) ≡ U c(τ) ()  e




over all feasible alternative consumption paths c(τ), where U c(τ) ( ) denotes the most general, 
idealized utility function comprising both direct consumption as well as the enjoyment of non-  4
market goods and services, and ￿ is the social rate of time preference.
1  If it is desirable to avoid 
unnecessarily degrading resources, and if sustainability has normative standing as a policy goal, 
then dynamic efficiency is a necessary condition for a normatively meaningful interpretation of 
this concept. 
The important point here is that W(t) must capture total welfare. Anything else can be 
misleading. Omitting contributions to welfare of any kind of capital will lead to an underestimate 
of the total value of W(t), and omitting any form of capital depreciation will lead to an 
overestimate. The theoretical implications of technological and population change have been 




3. Intergenerational Equity 
Although we have argued that dynamic efficiency is necessary for a normatively useful 
definition of sustainability, we do not believe that dynamic efficiency is a sufficient condition for 
sustainability.
3 It is also essential for consistency with widely embraced definitions of this 
concept that the maximized total welfare function not decrease over time. Formally, an 
optimized consumption path fulfills the condition of intergenerational equity if 
                                                 
1  This formulation as well as the notation used in equation (2) are consistent with Arrow et al. (2002), which calls 
the solution of this problem the “present value of felicities.” Weitzman (2002) refers to it as a measure of 
“welfare-equivalent sustainability.” 
2  Pezzey and Toman (2001) provide a survey of these issues. Heal (1998, 2001), Solow (1991), and Weitzman 
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well being over time,” formally presented in equation (2). One exception in the current literature is Asheim, 
Buchholz and Tungodden (2001), who impose so-called efficiency and equity axioms and show that if social 
preferences fulfill these two axioms, any optimal path will lead to an efficient and non-decreasing path, thus 
implicitly including dynamic efficiency in the definition of sustainability. For an earlier discussion of 





where W(t) represents the maximized total welfare function from equation (1). 
This brings us to an economic definition of sustainability: an economy is sustainable if 
and only if it is dynamically efficient and the resulting stream of maximized total welfare 
functions is non-declining over time. 
 
4. Sustainability 
We acknowledge that the above definition provides a demanding pair of decision criteria 
that cannot be considered to be very useful as a guide for public policy. The same is true, 
however, of the benchmark of a Pareto-improving policy — one which makes some members of 
society better off, but makes no one worse off (1896). Actual Pareto improvements are 
exceptionally rare, of course, perhaps even non-existent. Hence, the strict Pareto criterion is 
virtually never taken as a guide for public policy, despite its considerable normative appeal. 
Economists resort instead to seeking “potential Pareto improvements” in the Kaldor-Hicks sense 
— the world is viewed as being made better off if the magnitude of gains and the magnitude of 
losses are such that the gainers can fully compensate the losers for their loses and still be better 
off themselves.
4 Note that under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the change is considered to be an 
improvement whether or not the compensation actually takes place. Actual compensation of 
losers by winners is essentially left to the political process. 
What is key is that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is a necessary condition for satisfying the 
strict Pareto criterion. If a policy proposal fails the Kaldor-Hicks test, it cannot pass the Pareto 
test. If a proposed change is not a potential Pareto improvement, it cannot be a Pareto 
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improvement. This is the fundamental theoretical foundation — the normative justification — 
for employing benefit-cost analysis, that is, for searching for policies that maximize the positive 
difference between benefits and costs. 
Similarly, we can think of an economy as having the potential to become sustainable if it 
fulfills the criterion of dynamic efficiency. It can then, in principle, be made sustainable by 
appropriate intergenerational transfers to achieve a non-declining total welfare path. One such 
economy that can be made sustainable has been formalized by Hartwick (1977), in which there 
exists the possibility of turning exhaustible resources into capital stock, a particular type of 
intergenerational transfer. If the Hartwick rule of investing all rents from exhaustible resources in 
reproducible capital is followed, then the economy can be made sustainable.
5 
Much as economists have long focused on potential rather than actual Pareto 
improvements, leaving the allocation of net gains among individuals (and, hence, the resolution 
of debates regarding distributional equity) to the political process, similar reasoning leads to an 
analogous approach to the sustainability debate. In theory, it may be argued that sustainability is 
ultimately the most desirable policy goal, but in practice it is more reasonable to aim for 
potential sustainability in the form of dynamic efficiency (of an all-encompassing societal 
welfare function).
6 
                                                 
5  The conditions under which the Hartwick rule holds, however, are restrictive. Asheim and Buchholz (2000) 
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We recognize that this opens an avenue for criticism of economics as being excessively 
focused on efficiency rather than equity, but the efficiency criterion and related analytical 




Sustainability is a broad concept, but it does not need to be “vague,” as Solow (1991) has 
argued. Interpretations that are acceptable both to natural scientists and economists should be 
possible. We find that sustainability can be conceptualized simply and clearly by employing a 
conventional economics framework, based on discounted utilitarianism. In short, a sustainable 
growth path is one which is both dynamically efficient and which is non-decreasing over time. 
Much as a potential Pareto improvement in the Kaldor-Hicks sense can yield Pareto optimality 
when combined with appropriate compensation of losers by winners, so too can dynamic 
efficiency lead to the more ambitious goal of sustainability when it is combined with appropriate 
intergenerational transfers. And much as economics often resorts to seeking potential Pareto 
improvements, leaving the final allocation to the political process, so too may it focus on 
dynamic efficiency, leading to the possibility, at least, of actual sustainability. 
                                                 
7  One of the most prominent critiques of this focus of economics on efficiency has been offered by Sen (1970). He 
points out that a society may be efficient “even when some people are rolling in luxury and others are near 
starvation, as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich. In 
short, a society can be Pareto optimal and still be perfectly disgusting.” Our definition of sustainability does 
involve notion of distributional equity by including both dynamic efficiency and intergenerational equity. We 
argue only that the comparative advantage of economics lies in its focus on the first element, whereas the 
comparative advantage of politics lies in focusing on distributional considerations.   8
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